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Pierre Trudeau’s White Paper and the Struggle for
Aboriginal Rights in Canada: An Analysis of the
Extent to which the White Paper was a Turning Point
in the Struggle for Aboriginal Rights and Land Claims
in Canada
Elisabetta Kerr
University of Toronto
Abstract
This paper contends that Pierre Trudeau’s 1969 “White
Paper” on the status of Aboriginals in Canada was not a major
turning point in improving the status of Aboriginals in Canada, but
succeeded in inspiring activism and interest in the plight of Canada’s
First Nations. The policy attempted to redefine the Canadian
government’s relationship with its Aboriginal peoples, expressing the
centrality of the government in Aboriginal affairs and reinforcing its
obliviousness to the needs of Canada’s First Nations. The White
Paper proposed to remove “Indian Status” for Aboriginals, and as a
result was vehemently rejected. The effects of the proposed
revocation of Status Indians persisted through the social activism and
awareness that it inspired. This paper traces the development BritishAboriginal relations following the fall of New France. Diplomacy and
treaty-making in the prelude to the White Paper will be considered,
along with the changing conception of “Indian Status” throughout
Canadian history. Thus, this paper argues that although the White
Paper was a necessary step in the realization of the dire condition of
Aboriginals in Canada, it did not provoke any lasting government
policies that recognized absolute Aboriginal rights and liberties.
Keywords: White Paper, Aboriginal rights, Aboriginal land claims,
Canadian History, Canadian-Aboriginal relations
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F

irst Nations land rights in Canada have been called into question

since European settlers first reached North America. Territorial
cessions and disputes pervaded centuries of French and British
dominion, and coincided with Canadian confederation. From the
British Royal Proclamation of 1763 to the present day, pervasive
tensions and disagreements have shaped interactions between First
Nations and European colonists. In 1969, Prime Minister Pierre
Trudeau and his Minister of Indian Affairs, Jean Chrétien, released
the “Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy.”
Colloquially known as the “White Paper,” the policy document was
the culmination of a century of mismanaged relations between the
Government of Canada and the First Nations. The White Paper was
intended to redefine the Canadian Government's relationship with
the First Nations. The Paper affirmed the centrality of the federal
government in Aboriginal affairs, revoking “Indian status” while
claiming to prevent discrimination against First Nations peoples.1
However, intense backlash from the First Nations immediately
following the White Paper’s release prompted the Canadian
Government to reject it as unfeasible. As a result, the White Paper
was not a major turning point in the struggle for Aboriginal rights
and land claims in Canada. Rather, it was a singular event in the
continued plight of Canada’s First Nations. By understanding Pierre
Trudeau’s White Paper as a catalyst for the expansion of public
awareness of the social and legal struggles faced by Canada’s First
Nations, it becomes apparent that the 1969 White Paper initiated an
improvement in First Nations activism and advocacy, but not
tangible change in government policy. The historical significance of
the White Paper resonates with present-day supporters of First
Nations rights and land claims in Canada. Understanding the origins
of and reactions to the 1969 White Paper can help to reveal nuances
Jean Chrétien, “Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy,”
Ministry of Indian Affairs and Northern Development to the First Session of the
Twenty-Eighth Parliament. 1969.
1
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of the First Nations’ continued struggle for recognition.
Formal diplomatic relations between the British and First Nations
began with the 1763 British Royal Proclamation. The Proclamation
declared that relations between the Crown and First Nations would
be on a nation-to-nation basis.2 This stipulation recognized the
autonomy of the First Nations as a distinct diplomatic power.
Treaties were made under the doctrine of terra nullis, “nobody’s land;”
unoccupied land that was free for the taking and was not subject to
the sovereignty of a recognized state. Contemporary European
perceptions of international law stated that full title could be
acquired through conquest; however, the Crown chose to pursue land
cessions through treaty and agreement.3 The First Nations were thus
considered independent of the Crown when relations were
established.4
In his work A New Look at Canadian Indian Policy, Gordon Gibson
outlines two key patterns of diplomacy adopted by the British
Crown: nation-to-nation and collective treatment rather than
individual treatment.5 The Crown favoured the latter principle of
collective treatment, signifying that the First Nations were regarded
as undeserving of dignified treatment as individuals in legal matters.
Therefore, the Crown’s perception of the First Nations as a
“nuisance to colonization” was the basis for land cessions.6 Policies
that promoted isolation were convenient for keeping the First
Nations out of consideration until the 1960s.7 In addition, a court
decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, in the 1888
case St. Catherine’s Milling v. The Queen, determined that First Nations’
2
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Gordon Gibson, A New Look at Canadian Indian Policy: Respect the
Collective, Promote the Individual (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 2009), 34.
Gibson, A New Look at Canadian Indian Policy, 35.
A-G. Gagnon, "Canada: Unity and Diversity," Parliamentary Affairs 53, no.
1 (2000): 14.
Gibson, A New Look at Canadian Indian Policy, 36.
Gibson, A New Look at Canadian Indian Policy, 36.
Gibson, A New Look at Canadian Indian Policy, 38.
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title to land was only allowed at the Crown’s discretion. This
presupposed that the First Nations peoples were not civilized enough
to have inherent land-ownership rights, and as such did not have legal
ownership of the land upon which they lived. St. Catherine's Milling set
a precedent for land rights that denied the First Nations land
ownership on the basis that they did not have the same conception
of land ownership as the British Crown. This discrepancy continued
to be exploited by the Crown, and later by the Canadian government,
in First Nations land rights legislation.8
The British North America Act of 1867 further complicated First
Nations land rights. The constitutional settlement of Confederation
did not recognize the First Nations as a founding nation of Canada,
even though they had previously been treated as an independent
nation.9 The Act effectively made the First Nations wards of the state
stripping them of their autonomy and intrinsic rights.10 Moreover,
section 91 of the Act delegated former colonial power to the
centralized Canadian government. “Indians and land reserved for
Indians” were now completely under state control, terminating the
diplomatic relationship between the Crown and First Nations.11
Gibson asserts that the incorporation of discrimination and racism
into basic Canadian law was the foundation for our contemporary
splintered “parallel society.”12 According to Gibson, these
discriminating and demeaning policies set the foundation for public
disagreements about the nature of First Nations rights and land
claims.
The 1876 Indian Act and the 1880 Indian Act further justified
the marginalization of Aboriginal peoples within Canadian society
8
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Peter Kulchyski, “The Violence of the Letter: Land Claims and Continuing
Colonial Conquest in Canada,” Canadian Dimension 41, no. 1 (2007): 20.
Gagnon, “Canada: Unity and Diversity,” 13.
Karen Virag, “A “Disatrous Mistake”: A Brief History of Residential
Schools,” ATA Magazine 86, no. 2 (2005), 19.
United Kingdom. Parliament of the United Kingdom. The British North
America Act of 1867, Enactment no. 1. Section 91 (24). 1867.
Gibson, A New Look at Canadian Indian Policy, 39.
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and legislation. These Acts abolished self-government and placed
finance, social services, and education under federal control.13
Furthermore, Aboriginal peoples’ right to mobility was curtailed;
individuals were assigned to bands, which were in turn assigned to
reserves. In this way, the Indian Act imposed a majoritarian democracy
upon minorities while strengthening the executive branch of
government.14 The Department of Indian Affairs was created to
implement new Aboriginal policy and deal with the so-called “Indian
Problem.”15 This prompted the creation of residential schools, which
promoted assimilation by reinforcing the English or French language
and the Christian religious tradition. Federal policies removed the
autonomy of the Aboriginals in treaty-making and self-government,
effectively preventing them from becoming either Canadian citizens
or a separate nation.16 By the turn of the twentieth century, First
Nations rights had been completely overshadowed by the motives of
the Canadian state.
The deplorable conditions of Aboriginal rights and freedoms
remained relatively consistent and unchallenged until the return of
First Nations soldiers after the Second World War. Aboriginal
servicemen began to question their treatment by Canadian society,
especially regarding the colonization of the First Nations’ traditional
lands.17 The 1950s and 1960s saw increasing public awareness but
little political activism, as social and legal inequities became more
apparent to both Canadians and First Nations. The formation of
First Nations activist groups, such as the Federation of Saskatchewan
Indians in 1961 and the National Indian Brotherhood in 1968,
demonstrated the growing demand for recognition and action on

Virag, “A Disastrous Mistake,” 19.
Gibson, A New Look at Canadian Indian Policy, 41.
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Virag, “A “Disastrous Mistake,” 19.
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Virag, “A “Disastrous Mistake,” 19.
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Howard Ramos, “Opportunity for Whom?: Political Opportunity and Critical
Events in Canadian Aboriginal Mobilization, 1951-2000,” Social Forces 87,
no. 2 (2008), 800.
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behalf of Canadian First Nations. 18 The 1966 Hawthorn
Commission was established to further investigate the social position
of the First Nations in Canadian Society. The Survey of the
Contemporary Indians of Canada was submitted to the Minister of
Indian Affairs and Northern Development, and indicated the
government’s refusal to assimilate the First Nations. However, this
policy was contradicted by the Commission’s recommendation that
Natives leave their reserves to seek a place in the wider Canadian
economy.19 Hawthorn further recommended spending large amounts
of money to obtain minimum standards of living on reserves, but
stipulated that the burden be pushed onto provinces in order to
encourage integration into society.20 The report coined the term
“citizens plus,” emphasizing exorbitant expenditures on Aboriginal
peoples as reparations for decades of neglect under the Canadian
system and to ensure the preservation of their separate identity.21 The
Commission was not fully implemented because its recommendations
were so costly, but it was integral in providing the initial framework
for the 1969 White Paper. The paper offered a distinct vision of how
to integrate Aboriginals into wider Canadian society, though it
maintained the notion of a special citizenship.
Given the heightened interest in Aboriginal affairs, Pierre Trudeau
and his Minister of Indian Affairs, Jean Chrétien, produced the 1969
White Paper. Trudeau’s vision of a “just society” that valued
individual liberty and freedom of opportunity as the cornerstone of
the policy. In addition, Trudeau viewed the special legal provision of
“citizens plus” as discriminatory towards both Natives and
Canadians.22 The White Paper stipulated a six-point plan for change.
Virag, “A Disastrous Mistake,” 19.
Tom Flanagan, First Nations? Second Thoughts, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 2000), 179.
20
Gibson, A New Look at Canadian Indian Policy, 44.
21
Flanagan, First Nations? Second Thoughts, 179; James Frideres and René
R. Gadacz. Aboriginal Peoples in Canada: Contemporary Conflicts, 6th ed.,
(Toronto: Pearson Education Canada, 2001), 319.
22
Gagnon, “Canada: Unity and Diversity,” 17.
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It recommended that legislative and constitutional bases of
discrimination be removed, and that there be popular recognition of
the contribution of First Nations culture to Canadian life. In
addition, the paper recommended that services be provided through
the same channels and government agencies for all Canadians, and
that those who are furthest behind be helped the most. Moreover, it
reinforced that lawful obligations towards all Canadians be
recognized, including control of First Nations land being transferred
to the traditional inhabitants.23 The White Paper also proposed three
possible courses of action: continuation of reserves, assimilation, or
a “full role in Canadian society and in the economy while retaining,
strengthening and developing an Indian identity which preserves the
good things of the past and helps Indian people to prosper and
thrive.”24 In effect, the White Paper would eliminate the legal status
of “Indian” in an aim to equalize all Canadians, although it explicitly
rejected the idea of assimilation.
The White Paper invoked an inflammatory response from the First
Nations peoples across Canada. Harold Cardinal, a Cree activist,
published The Unjust Society in response. Cardinal denounced the
White Paper as “no better than cultural genocide,” and a “thinly
disguised programme of extermination through assimilation.”25 To
Canada’s First Nations, the White Paper implied that reserves and
treaties recognizing First Nations rights would be terminated.26 This
directly threatened the livelihood of the First Nations of Canada by
revoking access to their traditional lands. In effect, the White Paper
would rescind promises of First Nations autonomy made both by the
British Crown and Canadian government. The White Paper was
rejected because of its blatant disregard for the interests of the First
Nations, even though they had participated in research and
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consultation.27 In addition, the White Paper ignored the Hawthorn
Commission’s recommendations on the topic of special rights.28 The
First Nations regarded the White Paper as offensive in its glaring
disregard for their rights, compromising what was intended by the
government to be a gesture of reparation and progress. The White
Paper itself did not advance policy-making on Aboriginal rights; on
the contrary, it ignited fierce backlash and controversy.
The chiefs of Canada argued that Trudeau had failed to provide for
those First Nations who simply wanted to continue living under the
old system and preserve their traditional lands and culture.29 Harold
Cardinal led the publication of “The Red Paper,” or Citizens Plus, a
satirical response to the White Paper on behalf of the First Nations
leaders in Alberta. In the document, Cardinal and the Indian Chiefs
of Alberta advocated for a return to the original treaty relationship
and the idea that the First Nations of Canada have additional rights
compared to other Canadians.30 Media interest grew, creating unity
among the First Nations and piquing the sympathies of many other
Canadians. When Trudeau finally abandoned the White Paper due to
public backlash in 1971, the “evolving process of gradual
improvement in Indian affairs” was abated by the abrupt and forceful
attempt to make progress.31 In his article “The New Indian Wars,”
Les Sillars argues that the consequences of not accepting the White
Paper have been “costly and tragic…32 Now [the First Nations
peoples] blame their leaders, not segregation, for their suffering – the
continual denial of the need for radical reform only prolongs the
Sally M. Weaver, “Public Reaction and Government Response,” in Making
Canadian Indian Policy: The Hidden Agenda 1968-70, (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1981), 173.
28
Weaver, “Public Reaction and Government Response,” 173.
29
Gibson, A New Look at Canadian Indian Policy, 47.
30
Indian Association of Alberta, Citizens Plus.
31
Gibson, A New Look at Canadian Indian Policy, 47.
32
Les Sillars, “The New Indian Wars: Trudeau's Repudiated Integrationist 1969
White Paper May Still Offer the Only
Hope for the
Strife-torn Reserves of 1997,” Alberta Report 24, no. 45 (1997): 6.
27
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government's denial of basic rights and freedoms.”33 These
conflicting viewpoints argue for the same principle in starkly
contrasting ways, illustrating two perspectives of a devastatingly
complex issue with a single desired outcome.
Though the general negativity toward the White Paper abated after it
was rejected, a desire for progress resonated among the First Nations.
Tom Flanagan argues in his work First Nations? Second Thoughts that it
created a “new era in Native politics.” Flanagan contends that the
White Paper introduced the themes that would prevail in future
policy and activism. Aboriginal rights, land claims, and selfgovernment replaced the older concerns of the war on poverty and
the notion of “citizens plus.”34 According to S. M. Weaver, the White
Paper became the “single most powerful catalyst in the Indian
nationalist movement,” which gave First Nations cause to reaffirm
their heritage and identity while organizing against the government.35
The White Paper provoked discussion and debate about the meaning
of citizenship and the nature of Canadian federalism. Gibson
highlights that the immediate response by the federal government
was to send money and responsibilities to the First Nations’
independent band governments to avoid future liabilities related to
activism. As a result, authority and responsibility became more
difficult to trace as the development of First Nations policy passed to
the courts.36 The complexity of the issue in both was emphasized as
First Nations and non-First Nations activists became engaged. The
White Paper was thus a turning point in activism on behalf of First
Nations rights, though it failed to produce a lasting change in policymaking.
The ramifications of the White Paper legitimized First Nations rights
and claims, though there was inconsistency in government policy. As
the social and political movement gained momentum, the First
Sillars, “The New Indian Wars,” 8.
Flanagan, First Nations? Second Thoughts,180.
35
Weaver, “Public Reaction and Government Response,” 171.
36
Gibson, A New Look at Canadian Indian Policy, 48.
33
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Nations took up more lawsuits against the federal and provincial
governments of Canada. In Calder v. Attorney-General of BC (1973), the
Nisga'a people nearly won a declaration of ownership of the Nass
Valley in British Columbia, on the grounds that there were no formal
treaties that ceded land ownership.37 The treaty system was
modernized in 1974 when the Office of Native Claims was created as
a joint venture between the Department of Indian Affairs and
Northern Development and the National Indian Brotherhood.38 To
this day, treaties are still arranged such that no rights or title exist
independent of the agreement. As a result, more First Nations
peoples see modern treaties as a method of reasserting their
continuing ownership of traditional territories.39 This regressive
policy discounts the agency and autonomous rights of the First
Nations. Such technicalities exacerbate tensions and inhibit
productive and progressive legislation, which would advance the
struggle for aboriginal rights and land claims.
Though the White Paper was a necessary step in realizing the
condition of First Nations in Canada, it did not provoke any lasting
government policies that recognized their rights and liberties. Since
the British Royal Proclamation, there has been no significant
legislative reform. First Nations activism reached a turning point with
the release of the 1969 White Paper, beyond which the struggle
became more public and widely legitimized. The government’s
lacklustre response reflects an apathetic First Nations policy that
stems from necessity, rather than a desire for justice. Progress
towards acknowledging the need for change has been diminished by
inadequate policy-making. Therefore, while the White Paper
produced meaningful activism for First Nations rights, the lack of
policy change to match the demand for rights has ultimately
trivialized the First Nations’ struggle for equity and justice.
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